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Learning the Fighting Game: 
Black Americans and the First World War 
 
By: S. Marianne Johnson 
 
Not unlike the larger legacy of the First World War, the legacy of the African American 
experience in the war is fraught with ambiguity and ambivalence. Added to the reductive and yet 
popular narrative of a futile war is an element of racial hopes dashed against the rocks of white 
supremacy. Wartime achievements of black soldiers and hopes for the end of Jim Crow washed 
away in a river of blood during the Red Summer of 1919 when lynching and race violence rose 
to an unparalleled level.46 The intensity of the violence, however, masks the unprecedented 
black militancy, assertion of civil rights, and the right to fight, both politically and physically 
against injustice during the war and in its immediate aftermath. Without denying the impact of 
the sufferings inflicted on the African American community during the Red Summer, this study 
seeks to explore ways in which African Americans sought agency and laid the foundation for 
later decades more readily associated with the Civil Rights Movement. Rather than entering the 
First World War with naïve illusions of equality and empty idealism, African Americans 
carefully and shrewdly used the war as an opportunity to broadcast America’s racial hypocrisy 
internationally and, by doing so, begin raising conscious awareness of the Pan-African diaspora.  
Early on in 1917, black activists such as W.E.B. Dubois recognized the war as 
opportunity for the black American. Through his magazine The Crisis, Dubois was able to 
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convey his attitudes about race to black America. Started in 1910, The Crisis enjoyed a 
readership of ten thousand in its first year alone and became renowned for having the most 
militant black voice in America.47 In May of 1917, The Crisis urged its readers to treat the war 
as an opportunity. Already, the magazine noted, the Russians had used the war to overthrow 
cruel czarism and British suffragettes had gained the vote through the war. Dubois, watching the 
international developments coming out of the war, encouraged black American men to enlist and 
win their rights on the field of battle.48  
For one seeking to understand the mind of the average black American during the 
beginning of the twentieth century, it becomes very difficult to understand how a man who had 
been subjugated by Jim Crow and treated as a   citizen could then enlist in a Jim Crow 
segregated army claiming to be fighting for the safety of democracy. In addition to the Dubois 
interpretation of winning rights by fighting, one other prevalent argument in the historiography 
of the black experience of the First World War claims many blacks were apathetic about or 
outright opposed world war because they recognized the transparency of Wilson’s “Safe for 
Democracy” motto.49 These African Americans noted that the Germans had never done anything 
to them personally, and fighting for democracy in a Jim Crow army was simply too ironic to 
bear. 50 According to this argument, many who did support the war did so less out of a conscious 
political choice and more out of dedication to a loved one in the service or were drafted without 
understanding the causes for war.51 Certainly, there were individuals opposed to the war, 
notably the young A. Philip Randolph. In addition, some uneducated sharecroppers may not 
have understood the global conflict and instead supported the war effort because of loved ones 
overseas. However, to leave the question of motivation at uneducated, blind support of family 
                                                     
47 Theodore Kornweibel, Jr., “Investigate Everything”: Federal Efforts to Compel Black Loyalty 
during World War I (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2002), 118. 
48The Crisis, May 1917, 8. Accessed via GoogleBooks.  
49 President Wilson rationalized the American entry into the war as a moral obligation to  
“make the world safe for democracy.” The irony hit home to African Americans who had not  
experienced America as the supposed beacon of Democracy.  
50 Williams, Torcherbearers, 24. 
51 Williams, Torchbearers, 60; Mjagkij, Loyalty in Time of Trial, 122. 
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members does a serious injustice to the political thinking of African Americans at the turn of the 
century.52 
Rather than misunderstanding the political scene or struggling to choose between loyalty 
to race or loyalty to nation, the black press provided interesting insight into ideas of what it 
meant to be an American. What quickly became apparent from numerous newspaper editorials 
and opinion sections was just how willing many black Americans were to serve. Drawing on a 
long history of service, from the Revolution to the turn of the century, from Crispus Attucks to 
the 54th Massachusetts to Col. Charles Young, black America recalled its history of patriotism 
with pride. Indeed, as the black press gloried in their proud heritage, it could not help from 
jabbing at the uncomfortable heritage of the white South as former rebels to the Union.53 “We 
have a record to defend,” Col. Young, writing in The Crisis, declared, “but no treason, thank 
God, to atone or explain.”54 Others displayed similar sentiments, writing, “The Negro is far 
more loyal to his country and its ideals than the white Southern American. He has never been a 
disloyal rebel. He never fought for slavery in a land of liberty.”55 It was argued the black 
soldier’s stellar service record and heritage of true patriotism in the face of enslavement and 
mistreatment made him more American than white Southerners and served as a potent threat to 
white supremacy.56 Interpreting the drums of war as the death knell of the white supremacists of 
the former Confederacy, The Crisis also declared, “The slave-thinking South is beset by fear of 
losing these [African American] peons…”57  
The powerful implications of this rhetoric were not missed by the white South. Many 
white Southerners did not want blacks to serve in the military. Senator James K. Vardaman of 
Mississippi, speaking out against a universal draft, stated, “Universal military service means that 
millions of Negroes who will come under this measure will be armed. I know of no greater 
                                                     
52 Margaret Black’s Corner, “Doing Your Bit,” Baltimore Afro-American, April 26, 1918; 
Black, “Women’s Department,” Baltimore Afro-American, November 3, 1917. 
53 The term “white South” is problematic because it reduces an entire population 
without acknowledging nuances, but for the purpose of this study, “white South”  
refers to the widespread white support of segregation and Jim Crow in the South. 
54 The Crisis, May 1917, 22. 
55 The Crisis, May 1917, 8. 
56 “Colored Citizens Show Patriotism,” Baltimore Afro-American, April 28, 1917. 
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menace to the South than this.”58 The Ku Klux Klan, reestablished in 1915, stepped up violence 
and lynching increased steadily throughout the war years.59 When whites proved unable to block 
African American military service, southern white civic leaders took to reporting on so-called 
seditious black newspapers and accusing them of disseminating German anti-American 
propaganda. White informants reported to the FBI that black publications such as The Crisis, 
Baltimore Afro-American, and The Chicago Defender were outside agitators inciting race 
violence in the South and serving as agents of German sabotage to destroy the American home 
front.60 
There was nothing unusual or uncharacteristic about the white South invoking images of 
an outside agitator. From abolitionists and newspaper reporters, to the later Freedom Riders and 
activists of the 1960s Civil Rights Movement, the white South systematically refused to 
recognize discontent in southern blacks and refused to take responsibility for their own actions, 
scapegoating the ever-elusive “outside agitator.” What was unusual, however, was the black 
response. Boldly and candidly in June of 1917, The Crisis pointed out that without black 
mobilization, America would not have enough manpower to win the war. In an editorial directed 
toward the white South, the article closed with an ultimatum:  
So there you are, gentlemen, and take your choice,-- We’ll fight or work. We’ll 
fight and work. If we fight we’ll learn the fighting game and cease to be so “aisily 
lynched.” If we don’t fight we’ll learn the more lucrative trades and cease to be so 
easily robbed and exploited. Take your choice, gentlemen. “We [white 
southerners] should worry.”61 
 
Boldness in response like this was something not seen since Radical Reconstruction. 
Recognizing and using the ability to harness economic power through work and physical power 
through military training in order to gain civil rights offered a new level of confidence that had 
not been seen before from black America. In the same article, The Crisis published a detailed list 
of demands to be gained in return for fighting that to the well-read historian of the black 
freedom struggle will seem somewhat reminiscent of the famous World War II Double V 
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campaign.62 The First World War version of Double V called for black officers, universal 
suffrage, an end to lynching, the abolition of segregated railcars, the repeal of segregation 
ordinances, and equal rights in all public institutions.63 By July 1917, the black community 
experienced two blows that had the potential to derail the whole campaign. Race riots broke out 
in East St. Louis. Militiamen and police stood and watched while white rioters set fire to 
buildings, mowed down blacks trying to escape the flames, and beat or lynched any black man, 
woman, or child in sight. One black woman was drug from a street car by two white teenage 
girls and beat senseless with her own shoes. In Memphis, a sixteen year old black girl was found 
raped and beheaded with an ax.64 With this devastating news in hand, The Crisis called on men 
to “ENLIST! With Memphis and East St. Louis fresh in our memoires, we know that the fight 
for humanity and democracy abroad is not more important than the fight for humanity and 
democracy at home.”65 These demands and the willingness to fight for them demonstrate a new 
level of commitment to gain rights. 
 What caused this newfound confidence and willingness to be more vocal about 
injustices? This time, the world was watching. Often the practice of using media to broadcast 
American race hypocrisy internationally is seen as a Cold War tactic. Yet, a casual glance 
through the black press in 1917-1918 severely rebuffs that notion.66 The German invasion of 
Belgium and the atrocities committed by invading German soldiers provided the Allies with 
effective propaganda to frame the war as a crusade against the barbarous Hun. Horror stories of 
raped women and bayonetted babies circulated among the Allies and justified the war in moral 
                                                     
62 The Double V, a term coined by the Pittsburg Courier, was a campaign during the Second 
World War aimed at victory of fascism abroad and white supremacy at home. For a more 
detailed understanding of Double V, see Beth Bates, “Double V for Victory Mobilizes Black 
Detroit, 1941-1946,” in Freedom North: Civil Rights Struggles Outside the South, 1940 – 1980, 
ed. Jeanne Theoharis and Komozi Woodard (New York: Palgrave, 2003): 17-40. 
63The Crisis, June 1917, 60. 
64 The Crisis, August 1917, 176-178, 185. 
65 The Crisis, August 1917, 1. 
66 See Mary L. Dudziak, “Brown as a Cold War Case,” Journal of American History 91 (June 
2004): 32-42. Dudziak argues that Brown v. Board was less the product of racial progressivism 
and more the product of a desire to stop the Soviet propaganda ridiculing the United States for 
being a country that supposedly supports freedom and equality while it keeps its own black 
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terms.67 For America, however, the condemnation of German activity in Belgium served as 
double-edged sword when the all too easy parallel to Southern lynch mobs became standard. 
Photographs and descriptions of graphically lynched men and women accompanied by headlines 
such as “NOT BELGIUM-AMERICA” and the aforementioned riots described as “worse than 
anything the Germans did in Belgium” became part and parcel of black newspapers and 
magazines.68 By exposing the shockingly brutal realities of lynching in the South and race riots 
in the North, black Americans hoped to gain the attention of the world and pressure Wilson into 
supporting his high idealism with practical reform. 
 Drawing international attention to America’s double standard worked. An editorial 
appeared in The Crisis signed “An Asiatic Gentleman” ridiculed Americans for allowing black 
women and girls to be dragged into the streets and beaten while their menfolk served overseas.69 
Before this international attention could firmly enact change, the frantic federal government 
began actively investigating and silencing black newspapers deemed seditious. Under the 
Espionage Act, publications could be banned and post offices could refuse to distribute them.  
The Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB) sent black investigator Major Walter Loving to suppress 
the Chicago Defender, a publication that had criticized Wilson for his support of segregation 
and his passivity towards lynching. The MIB adopted a no tolerance policy for anyone 
disagreeing with or even constructively criticizing American institutions.  
Direct threats were received by the Defender and the NAACP board to reign in their 
editors. White civic leaders in the south became so afraid of the power of these condemnations 
they actually called for the execution of leading black editors.70 The federal government came 
down heavily on these criticisms beginning as early as mid-1917 and had effectively quieted The 
Defender by 1918, when more patriotic articles began to appear. The Crisis, however, largely 
due to the protection afforded by the whites in NAACP leadership positions and Major Loving’s 
                                                     
67 Alan Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 10-15, 
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reluctance to suppress black newspapers, remained relatively insulated and continued to publish 
graphic lynching stories and point out the all too obvious contradictions in Wilson’s ideology.71 
 Merely silencing black newspaper editors, however, was not enough. The damage had 
been done and Wilson and the white press were forced to cope with it. In 1918, Wilson gave a 
public statement strongly condemning lynching.72 The New York Times called for an end to 
lynching, not because it was morally wrong, but because it was “Hunlike.”73 “The United 
States,” the Times wrote, “can never properly appear as the exemplar of justice to the world as 
long as the negro, because he is a negro, is denied justice in certain sections of the country.”74 
Admonishments and actions against lynching were enacted not because of human compassion 
for the rights of others, but because it was in the best interest of United States foreign policy to 
save face by condemning injustice within her own borders. 
 Abroad, it became clear that the world war was anything but a white man’s war. Colonial 
soldiers from Africa and the West Indies, laborers from Asia, and entire fronts of battle in the 
Middle East and Eastern Europe meant that world war truly was a global experience. For the 
first time, the African diaspora met on the fields of France. Watching the way the great powers 
of the world mustered and exploited minority labor, black Americans increasingly saw the war 
as a vital moment which would impact the future of the nonwhite races of the world.75 More and 
more, black publications began to refer to the war as a race war. Interpreting the aggression of 
Imperial Germany and its desire to colonize in Africa as a serious threat to fate of nonwhites, 
publications such as The Crisis increasingly implored American blacks that German victory 
equaled black doom.76  
 Although the coming together of the diaspora in France was quite difficult due to 
language and cultural barriers, it was the first time that anything like this had happened. Black 
Americans saw that racism was a global issue, not just an American one, and colonial soldiers 
proved themselves to be surprisingly aware of the political and social situation in America and 
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began to question their own colonial subjugation.77 Black newspapers took a specific interest in 
African soldiers and frequently published photos of African units in full uniform and drill, 
demonstrating a shared race pride. The Crisis tallied up the number of blacks serving in Allied 
armies and arrived at a total number of over 50 million members of the African diaspora serving 
in fighting units, on ships, as laborers, etc.78 On the Western Front, of all places, is where the 
first true steps towards pan-African unity were made. Although communication was difficult 
due the language barrier, men, especially officers, were able to communicate through 
rudimentary French, broken English, and interpreters. One humorous anecdote involved a 
conversation between a black major and a French colonel with a sign around his neck that read 
“English spoken here.”79 The soldier, Arthur Little, would go on to describe other incidents with 
the men “swanking” with the French and “chattering in the most atrocious and wholly 
ununderstandable French.”80 By the end of their time together, French officers had picked up on 
some American slang and the many of the Hellfighters, especially the officers, had learned 
enough French to engage in basic conversation.81 
 Interpreting German desire to colonize Africa for its resources and gold as a new kind of 
slavery, The Crisis succinctly and proudly proclaimed, “The children of the slaves are marching 
on to Germany, singing in a tone of doom the songs that prophesy freedom to those whom the 
Kaiser has enslaved.”82 Included in the standard calls for an end to Jim Crow were now added 
demands that rights that colonial revenues go to the benefit and well-being of the colonies. 
Accompanied by one such call was a political cartoon titled “WAR: THE GRIM 
EMANCIPATOR.”83 The cartoon shows a young, strong Negro Wage Worker chained to the 
bulwark of Economic Slavery. From behind, Aries, the God of War, armed with a sword named 
War Work breaks the chain, freeing the young man, who is stepping forward and upward. 
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Participation in the war through service or support work was viewed as a legitimate avenue to 
attain freedoms. 
  As the war ended and the thousands of black veterans began home, uncertainties about 
the future of the race and the meaning of the war were already in question. A newspaper article 
appeared in the black newspaper The Washington Bee reassuring whites of the loyalty of the 
black soldier and attempting to quell their fears of thousands of armed and demobilized black 
men while simultaneously admonishing black soldiers not to instigate fights when they 
returned.84  
Initially, large welcome home parades took place across the country, where crowds both 
black and white in both North and South cheered returning black units. One of the best examples 
of these parades is the return of the famed 369th Regiment, better known as the Harlem 
Hellfighters. The Hellfighters parade in early February of 1919 drew a crowd of both white and 
black citizens hoping to catch a glimpse of the renowned unit. Many white spectators had come 
out to be entertained by stereotyped jazz as the soldiers marched. Instead, the 369th marched 
proudly in French phalanx formation to only French marches. The 369th, cast off by its own 
country and lent almost as an afterthought to the French, served proudly and returned proudly, 
choosing not to stoop to the Sambo minstrel jazz show the white spectators were expecting. 
They marched with a steady and determined step in the style of the country who had respected 
them, France. On the same day, Chicago welcomed back its own 8th Illinois black regiment, who 
also honored the French by wearing French-style uniforms. One jubilant man recalled that on 
these parade days, no one acknowledged the color line.85 Little wrote that the biracial crowd 
cheering them on welcomed them back not because they were a famous colored regiment or in 
spite of being a famous colored regiment. Instead, he specifically stated that the crowd cheered, 
“…because ours was a regiment of men, who had done the work of men.”86 Parades like this 
gave black veterans opportunities to demonstrate and display pride in the masculinity denied 
them by Jim Crow. 
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 And yet, the color line was firmly reestablished in the days following the welcoming 
parades. The narrative of the Red Summer is a familiar story, twenty six race riots in one year, 
seventy-seven lynchings, eleven of whom were veterans still in uniform, and the pushing back 
of African American activism into obscurity until the 1940s.87 The disillusioned black veteran, 
who fought for the country that afterwards forced him back into Jim Crow subjugation became a 
hugely popular literary trope. And yet, this trope plays on the larger problem of reducing the 
First World War to a series of stunted, futile failures. Lynching is not what makes the post war 
years unique. What is unique is that for the first time since the Colfax massacre of 1873, blacks 
began arming themselves and fighting back on a mass scale.88 Harkening back to the warning 
from The Crisis in early 1917, black veterans had learned the fighting game and many were 
willing to play it. Across the country, north and south, race riots broke out in unprecedented 
numbers. But this time, race riots did not always mean a mob of whites beating and killing 
unarmed, helpless blacks. This time, blacks believed, “race wars are going to be race wars.”89  
 Chicago in July of 1919 demonstrates the ways black defense had changed. After black 
teenager Eugene Williams was purposely drowned for crossing the invisible color line in a 
swimming area, black Chicago readied itself against the same crowds who had just welcomed 
the black 8th Infantry home. Armed veterans were used to enforce the peace and quell rioters. 
They also set up defensive positions they had used on the Western Front: sniper nests, guards 
posted on top of buildings, and in one case, even the utilization of a machine gun on rioters 
added a dimension of serious black militancy that had not been seen since Reconstruction.90 
Merely focusing on black victims of lynching without looking at the other side of black defense 
and even offense severely limits the understanding of the immediate post-war period.  
 Because of the prevalence of the myth of the Lost Generation and the acceptance of the 
Red Summer as a fully debilitating event, little attention has been given to black activism after 
the war. Although many attempts did end in disappointment, many developments in civil rights 
activism in the latter parts of the twentieth century can be directly linked to the immediate post-
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war years. Just months after the Armistice, W.E.B. Dubois and Senegalese politician Blaise 
Diagne coordinated a conference in France that was made up of fifty-seven delegates from 
Africa, America, and the West Indies to discuss the future of the race. Although the conference 
digressed into disagreement and squabble between Dubois and Diagne, for the first time black 
political organization opened a door for networking and the beginnings of the Pan-African 
movement that had not been available before.91  
 At home, black veteran activism proved adaptable to the circumstances. The American 
Legion, the association for veterans of the war, was unsure of how to handle race. 350,000 black 
men had served in the American Expeditionary Force, almost half of the entire AEF. Officially, 
the Legion did not order segregated posts. However, white Southerners were outraged and 
refused to adhere. The result was mixed and confusing. In the North, some posts were 
integrated, and some were segregated. In the South, there were several segregated black posts, 
the largest being in Louisville, Kentucky comprising 110 members.92 Recognizing the political 
power an organization such as the Legion would have, The Crisis urged its veteran readers in 
January of 1920 to do whatever it took to integrate the Legion. By 1920, three fourths of the 
states allowed black membership but South Carolina, Virginia, and Alabama remained adamant 
hold-outs. The Crisis told veterans, “We must not give up.  We cannot give up…Fight harder. 
Agitate, protest—join the American Legion and never give it one hour’s peace until every black 
soldier is a member.”93  
And yet, there was no mass protest by black veterans to join the Legion. Many did not 
express interest in joining what they perceived as yet another Jim Crow organization. Instead, 
many joined Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association, UNIA. Garvey 
welcomed the militant black veteran and the energy he brought. “The new Negro,” Garvey 
wrote, “is no coward. He is a man, and if he can die in France or Flanders for white men, he can 
die anywhere else, even behind prison bars, fighting for the cause of the race that needs 
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assistance.”94 Large numbers of black veterans participated in UNIA marches with a truly 
international and Pan-African focus.  
Although the lynching and race riots of the Red Summer make it seem that all war-time 
achievements ended in disillusioned disappointment, it is important to see past the mythologized 
literary trope of the lynched veteran and look at the practical legacy of the war. Thirty years 
later, when another world war threatened, specific lessons learned from the First World War 
impacted the way black activists handled the second. A. Philip Randolph recognized fighting 
alone had not won rights in the First World War and coupled fighting with economic pressure 
and the March on Washington Movement to push President Roosevelt into making reforms. The 
rhetoric of Double V itself comes directly from successes and failures of the First World War 
movement. A key difference, however, lies in the way the campaigns were conducted. During 
the First World War, black activists encouraged enlistment first in hopes that out of war service 
would flow civil rights. Seeing how that vision had not come to pass, the Second World War 
civil rights Double V campaign hinged war support as being contingent upon reforms paid up 
front. The March on Washington movement was different because it threatened to remove war 
support unless reform was achieved, whereas during the First World War blacks continued to 
support and serve hoping the ironies and inconsistencies would become too much for the Wilson 
administration to sustain while saving face.95 The international focus begun in the First World 
War laid the foundations for a thriving Pan-African movement several decades later and the 
militancy adopted by many veterans had similar rhetoric used later in the Black Power 
movement.96 
Black activism in the First World War is overlooked because of the violence of white 
resistance during the Red Summer of 1919 and the lack of concrete reforms. Hindsight hinders 
scholars in that it is all too easy to write off black veterans and activists of the First World War 
as naïve men and women who believed merely serving in the armed forces would gain respect 
and rights. Lastly, the image of the lynched black veteran still in his uniform is absolutely 
debilitating to the possibility that any important change took place. And yet, that narrative is 
reductive and inaccurate. Black activists saw winning the war as a vital step towards freeing the 
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colonized races of the world from colonial rule.  Black veterans serving on the front lines began 
the unification of the African diaspora. They started conversations that no level of violence has 
been able to end ever since. They learned the fighting game and brought it home with them, 
defending themselves in Chicago, becoming Garveyites and using the lessons they learned to re-
strategize with the Double V campaign of the Second World War. Black First World War 
veterans were not a Lost Generation doomed to naïveté. Rather, they were a Strong Generation. 
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